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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A MALAPROPIAN PROVISION OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
THOMAS F. GREEN, JR.t
I
"The legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case
where a general act can be made applicable."', The constitutions
of one-half of the states of the Union contain provisions to this
effect. 2 Iowa was the first to adopt a prohibition of this type.'
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in considering the legality of a
statute4 entitled "An act to legalize the organization of the inde-
pendent school district of Epworth, County of Dubuque, Iowa,"
said:
Certain irregularities in the manner of the organization of
the independent school district of Epworth, are alleged to
have occurred. No other such precise or analogous case is
alleged or suggested as existing anywhere else in the State.
No legal presumption arises that there is one. A general
law, therefore, which would be suited to the necessities of
the independent school district of Epworth, could have no
other or greater operation than the act in question; and if
it could or would have no other effect, then no advantage
could be derived, nor any evil avoided, by making a general
f A.B., University of Georgia, 1925; LL.B., 1925; J.S.D., University of
Chicago, 1931. Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1. Mich. Const. art. V, sec. 30.
2. Ariz., art. IV, sec. 11; Ark., art. V, see. 25; Cal., art. IV, sec. 25; Colo.,
art. V, sec. 25; Ill., art. IV, see. 22; Iowa, art. III, sec. 30; Ind., art. IV, see.
23; Kan., art. II, sec. 17; Ky., sec. 59, par. 29; Mich., art. V, sec. 30; Minn.,
art. IV, see. 33; Miss., art. IV, see. 87; Mo., art. IV, see. 33; Mont., art. V,
sec. 26; Neb., art. III, see. 18; Nev., art. IV, see. 21; N. M., art. IV, see. 24;
N. D., art. II, see. 70; Okla., art. V, see. 59; S. C., art. III, sec. 34; S. D.,
art. III, see. 23; Tex., art. III, sec. 56; Utah, art. IV, see. 26; Wyo., art.
III, see. 27. Maryland has a provision that although expressed differently
comes to much the same thing, art. III, sec. 33: "* * * And the General
Assembly shall pass no special law for any case for which provision has
been made by an existing general law. The General Assembly, at its first
session after the adoption of this constitution, shall pass general laws
providing for the cases enumerated in this section which are not already
provided for, and for all other cases where a General Law can be made
applicable." See also the New Jersey Constitution, art. 4, sec. 7. The
language of the other constitutions listed varies somewhat.
3. The language however is affirmative: " * * in all other cases where
a general law can be made applicable all laws shall be general and of
uniform operation throughout the state." Art. III, sec. 30.
4. Iowa Laws of 1868, c. 21.
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law instead of the law which was enacted. This law, then,
is not within the evil which the Constitution sought to pro-
vide against, nor would the enactment of a general law
therein afford any remedy for, or relief from, that evil.
From this decision as to the meaning of the original of this type
of constitutional prohibition it appears that a general law is
thought not to be applicable when no identical or analogous case
exists in the state other than the one specified in the statute chal-
lenged.
Missouri has a similar constitutional provision., The Supreme
Court of Missouri has said:
There can be no question but that an act which relates to
persons or things as a class is a general law. * * * It is well
settled, however, in this state, that it is only when the con-
ditions reasonably justify the distinguishing of a class, and
the law affects equally all who come within that class, that
such law is not within the constitutional inhibition.7
With this the Supreme Court of Iowa agrees. It has said of a
certain statute: "And it applies to all cities in the State falling
within the class specified, and, hence, is not local nor special, but
of uniform operation.",,
The Iowa court thus says that if the single object to which
the statute applies is in a class by itself, a general law cannot
be made applicable in the constitutional sense ;0 but two years
5. State v. Squires (1868) 26 Iowa 340, 344.
6. "In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no
local or special law shall be enacted; and whether a general law could have
been made applicable in any case is hereby declared a judicial question, and
as such shall be judicially determined, without regard to any legislative
assertion on that subject." Mo. Const., art. IV, sec. 53, par. 32.
7. State v. Swagerty (1907) 203 Mo. 517, 102 S. W. 483, 10 L. R. A.(N. S.) 601, 120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725, cited with approval in
Hays v. Hogan (1917) 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286, 293. "* * * and it is now
no longer an open question in the courts of this state that legislation ap-
plicable to a particular class is not violative of the constitutional provision
which prohibits the enactment of special laws." O'Connor v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1906) 198 Mo. 622, 97 S. W. 150, 153. This is the general
rule. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 259.
8. Haskel v. Burlington (1870) 30 Iowa 232, 237. See also McAunich v.
Mississippi, etc. R. R. (1866) 20 Iowa 338, 343; Iowa R. Land Co. v. Soper
(1874) 39 Iowa 112, 115.
9. State v. Squires (1868) 26 Iowa 340, cited supra, note 5. The court
held that in the case at bar a general law could not be made applicable.
Opinions that reach the opposite conclusion on the facts before them fre-
quently point out the possibility of drafting a bill which would include
other persons or things similarly situated. See Cloe and Marcus, Special
and Local Legislation (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 351, 367; Noler v. Whisman(1912) 243 Mo. 571, 147 S. W. 985, 988; Ex parte Lerner (1920) 281 Mo.
18, 218 S. W. 331, 333.
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later the same court indicates that a statute applying to an ob-
ject which is in a class by itself is a general law. 0 In the first
case the court should have held the curative act to be general."
It was no doubt misled by the language of the constitution,
"where a general law can be made applicable." If by definition
a general law is one that applies to all persons or things of a
class legitimately constituted, then a general law is applicable
to every situation save only that where the desire of the legisla-
ture is to give special privileges to individuals or groups less
than a class. It would seem that to prevent the consummation
of this desire is the purpose of the constitutional prohibitions.
Consequently the provision that general laws are required only
when applicable was not intended to permit the legislature to
give special, separate treatment to persons, things, or localities
whenever it suited the legislature's whim. Is not the provision
either nonsensical or equivalent to a prohibition of all special
and local legislation?
Comparatively little attention has been given by judges or com-
mentators to the problem of what is meant by "general act" and
"local or special act" in the provisions of state constitutions re-
stricting the passage of local or special acts. However, con-
sideration of the former law, the evil or mischief sought to be
remedied, and the remedy intended to be provided 2 discloses an
answer.
The former constitutional law (before the adoption of the re-
10. Haskel v. Burlington (1870) 30 Iowa 232. This second proposition is
almost universally accepted. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitatins (8th ed.
1927) 259; 59 C. J., Statutes (1932) 728, sec. 318. However, some reported
cases state the qualification that the law is special if it names the subject
instead of designating it by description since similar subjects may acquire
the characteristics of the class in the future but would be excluded by such
specification. This qualification does not apply to curative statutes. 1 Lewis'
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed. 1904) 398, sec. 214. Compare
note 31, infra, and accompanying text.
11. In affirming the constitutionality of an 1893 act providing for the
completion of a combination city hall and county courthouse for Minneapolis
the Supreme Court of Minnesota said: "No legislation more general in fact
than the act of 1893 would fully meet the case. If the act had been general
in form, it could not be made more general in fact and still fully cover the
situation. * * * we know that this is the only case of the kind * * * which
now exists or ever can exist * * * " State v. Cooley (1893) 56 Minn. 540,
58 N. W. 150, 154.
12. Cooley, Constitutional Law (4th ed. 1931) 428, sec. 6; 11 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law (1937) 675, sec. 62. This principle of construction is
applied to the special and local legislation provision of a state constitution
in McGregor v. Baylies (1865) 19 Iowa 43, 46.
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strictions) to a considerable extent permitted the passage of laws
naming or specifying the things, places, or persons to which the
laws applied. What evils are generally recognized as resulting
from the exercise by legislatures of this almost 13 unrestricted
liberty to differentiate? The following have been pointed out
by writers, judges, legislators, and members of constitutional
conventions:
1. Special and local laws violate the fundamental principle of
legislation that there should be but one rule for cases substan-
tially similar. 4
2. There is a tendency for material discriminations which in-
volve economic or other advantage to creep in."
3. The time of the legislature is wasted on trivial matters, and
its attention is distracted from the welfare of the state as a
whole.16 Elihu Root while presiding over a constitutional conven-
tion in New York said:
We found that the Legislature of the State had declined in
public esteem, and that the majority of the members of the
Legislature were occupying themselves chiefly in the promo-
tion of private and local bills, of special interests, with which
they came to Albany, private and local interests upon which
apparently their reelections to their positions depended, and
which made them cowards and demoralized the whole body."
4. The needlessly protracted sessions and unnecessarily in-
creased printing bill add to legislative expense.1 8
13. Even without constitutional provisions which expressly restrict spe-
cial and local legislation, some restriction exists; see infra, notes 64-70.
14. Jones, Statute Law Making (1912) 37; Maize v. State (1853) 4 Ind.
342, 348; 2 Indiana Constitutional Debates (1852) 1767.
15. See 1 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928)
426, sec. 150; Jones, loc. cit. supra, note 14; Cloe and Marcus, Special and
Local Legislation (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 351, 357; Anderson, Special Legisla-
tion in Minnesota (1922) 7 Minn. L. Rev. 133. "The theory of our institu-
tions is, that every man's civil liberty is the same with that of others,-
that all men are equal before the law in rights, privileges, and legal capa-
cities * * *. A State, therefore, has no business to bestow favors or to
establish unjust discriminations." Cooley, Constitutional Law (4th ed.
1931) 282.
16. Dealey, Growth of American State Constitutions (1915) 224; Debates
in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917-1918 (1920) 221,
222, 318, 319, 320, 337. The latter work is cited hereinafter as Mass. Const.
Debates.
17. Quoted in Mass. Const. Debates at 318.
18. Id. at 319, where it is said that average cost in Massachusetts of
every bill passed is $500; Small, Debates of the Georgia Constitutional
Convention of 1877, 167, 375; Dealey, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 225.
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5. Experience shows that lobbying, log-rolling, and corruption
increase,19 and that machine rule is strengthened when the legis-
lature customarily passes local legislation. The legislative bosses
can make it difficult for any member to bring up on the floor or
to get out of committee the local or special measures which his
constituents insist that he pass for them.20 As pointed out by
Mr. Root in the foregoing quotation, the member's reelection
seems to depend upon his successful representation of special in-
terests in his election district. Thus the political leaders are able
to place pressure upon the member and to force him to accept
their dictation. 21
6. The undue enlargement of the statute books makes the use
of the books difficult. 2 The important acts of state-wide interest
are buried among acts amending the charter of Homeville (popu-
lation 300), relieving John Smith from his obligation as surety
on a bail bond, reviving the Iron Foundry Corporation's charter
so that the corporation may be liquidated, or authorizing the
Trustees of Columbia Township to pave the sidewalks along a
certain road.
7. Most citizens of ability are unwilling to seek seats in the
legislature when a large part of that body's time is devoted to
trivial matters for which provision could be made by delegating
authority to administrative officers or to the people of the locality
affected, or by other general laws. Charles A. Beard says:
Persons of high standards and more than average intelli-
gence are not willing to waste their life trying to get an
iron bridge over Duck Creek in Posey township or working
for a highway through the town of Bad Angel. Business of
this kind appeals to men of small caliber; sometimes to men
deficient in integrity.28
19. Mass. Const. Debates at 321, 324, 363; Beard, American Government
and Politics (4th ed. 1924) 604; Chamberlain, Legislative Processes (1936)
237; Walker, Law Making in the United States (1934) 258; McGregor v.
Baylies (1865) 19 Iowa 43, 45.
20. Dealey, op. cit. supra, note 16, says at 224 that "through such
measures friends are won."
21. Chamberlain, op. cit. supra, note 19, at 242.
22. Mills v. Board (1918) 175 N. C. 215, 95 S. E. 481; Mass. Const.
Debates at 351, 319; Dealey, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 225; Jones, loc. cit.
supra, note 14.
23. Beard, op. cit. supra, note 19, at 604. "Really capable men wearied
by numerous demands on their time and patience in the consideration of
relatively unimportant matters drop out of our legislatures and yield place
to small men * * *." Dealey, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 224.
1939]
Washington University Open Scholarship
364 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
8. The passage of local legislation interferes with local self-
government.
24
9. Decisions concerning corporate and municipal charters re-
quire technical knowledge which legislators do not possess, and
careful investigation which legislators cannot, or at least do not,
make.
25
10. Special or local legislation does not have the benefit of
consideration by a considerable number of the legislators.20 The
wishes of the member or members from the district affected are
controlling. Judge White speaking to the Pennsylvania Bar As-
sociation of the scandal that had surrounded the Pennsylvania
Legislature prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1873 said:
What caused that scandal? Special legislation, local interest,
the retirement of statesmanship from its deliberations, and
the substitution of mere county commissionerships, that al-
lowed an individual from every locality to arise in his place
and say, "Mr. Speaker, that is my bill, what right has the
gentleman from Luzerne or elsewhere to interfere with it."
That settled it. No man had the temerity to contest a bill
of that character.
2 7
Such are the evils intended to be remedied. They are not mat-
ters of form but of substance. The form of a statute may be
general but the statute nevertheless apply only to an individual
24. Illinois Constitutional Convention Bulletins (1920) 378; Small, op.
cit. supra, note 18, at 167; McQuillin, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 426; Horack
and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone (1937) 12 Ind. L. J.
183, 193. "The very purpose of the restriction upon the power of the
legislature was to remit to the local authorities such functions of govern-
ment and administration as concerned the people of the locality, and which
could be better determined and discharged by such authorities than by the
central legislative body at the capital of the state." In re Burns (1898)
155 N. Y. 23, 49 N. E. 246, 247. See Van Riper v. Parsons (1878) 40 N. J.
L. 1, 5.
25. Mass. Const. Debates at 345; Chamberlain, op. cit. supra, note 19,
at 237.
26. State v. Lawrence Bridge Co. (1879) 22 Kan. 438, 456; and see
committee report in 1904 Maryland Bar Association Report at 160. In the
latter at pages 163 and 168 is this: "The local laws are so easily amended
or repealed that the temptation to 'do something' to win local acclaim or
political advantage cannot be resisted by the average assemblyman. * * *
And, under the ridiculous but prevailing theory that what the representa-
tives from a particular county say they want, is in fact wanted by, and is,
in fact beneficial to, the locality which they represent, and to the State,
the desired changes would as a matter of course be made.
"Under this theory of local lawmaking the patron and creator of the
law, to wit, the State, surrenders all right of judgment and acts merely as
the recorder of the wishes of individual members or groups of members.'"
27. (1899) 5 Pa. State Bar Ass'n Rep. 225.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss3/1
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
case which does not constitute a class. This is particularly true
of municipalities when the basis of differentiation is population.
In Missouri, an act has been held special and unconstitutional
which described the subject of the enactment as "all counties in
this state which contain or may hereafter contain two hundred
thousand and less than four hundred thousand inhabitants and
which county or counties contain one hundred and fifty miles or
more of macadamized roads outside of municipal corporations
and which county or counties pay to the county surveyor a sal-
ary of three thousand dollars or more annually" ;28 in Iowa, an
act which applied to "all cities in this state, which had by the
state census of 1885, a population of 30,000 or more" ;29 in Ohio,
an act to redistrict "every city * * * which had at the last federal
census a population not less than 5550 and not greater than
5560."
On the other hand, the specification of a named city to which
the law is to apply does not necessarily make it a special act.3
1
In affirming the constitutionality of a statute which provided for
borrowing money to complete a combination city hall and county
courthouse in Minneapolis, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
pointed out that the conditions under which the building was
being erected were unique and that the case dealt with in the
statute was the only case of the kind which existed or ever could
exist. The opinion says:
The last proposition to which we will refer is that the char-
acter of an act as general or special depends on its substance,
and not on its form. It may be special in fact although gen-
28. State v. Southern (1915) 265 Mo. 275, 177 S. W. 640.
29. State v. Des Moines (1896) 96 Iowa 521, 65 N. W. 818, 59 Am. St.
Rep. 381, 31 L. R. A. 186.
30. Kenton v. State (1894) 52 Ohio 59, 38 N. E. 885.
31. Usually, naming the person or municipal corporation in the statute
results in the statute being special. This is true not because the constitu-
tion forbids that form but because of the substantial requirement that all
similarly situated must be included. Even if no other person or municipality
is similarly situated at the time of the passage of the law, some may be in
an identical situation in the future. When the purpose is temporary or
there is no possibility of another case of the kind, the naming of the sub-
ject does not keep the act from being general. The statement to the con-
trary in Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation (1936) 24 Ky. L.
J. 351, 377, 378, is not borne out by the cases cited to support it. The very
first case cited (Webb v. Adams (1930) 180 Ark. 713, 23 S. W. (2d) 617)
says: "It is not the form, but the operation and effect, which determines the
constitutionality of a statute." 23 S. W. (2d) at 621. The other cases cited
do not emphasize the question of form.
1939)
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eral in form; and it may be general in fact, although special
in form. The mere form is not material * * *. In most, if
not all, of the adjudicated cases, the laws under considera-
tion were general in form, but were assailed as being special
in fact; but the test must be the same when the law is spe-
cial in form, but is claimed to be general in fact * * * .
Finally, as we have already seen, the facts that the law is
special in form, and that it applies to only a single object,
or, in the language of another rule, that the class consists of
only one member, are not important. Our conclusion is that
the act, although special in form, is general in fact, within
the meaning of the constitution. 2
Since the test for a local or special statute is not whether the
statute names the thing or things to which it applies, the test
must be the operation and effect of the statute. It is a special
or local statute when its operation and effect are such as to con-
tribute to the evils which the constitution seeks to remove. It
is a general statute when it does not exclude cases which are
substantially similar to those included in its operation, when it
makes no unjust distinctions and confers no special favors, and
when able and honest men will recognize that the differentiation
is justified and therefore time, attention, and money are not
wasted.33
Obviously a general law thus conceived can be adapted to
every legislative need. No matter how restricted the class which
the act includes, the act is general if the limits of the class have
a reasonable relation to the other provisions of the act.3 4 The
32. State v. Cooley (1893) 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150, 154.
33. This conclusion is of course based on the evils of special legislation
pointed out from time to time by writers and speakers and classified in
seven groups by the present writer. See the text accompanying notes 14
through 23, supra. The eighth, ninth, and tenth evils there listed do not
apply to all special and local legislation. They, therefore, seem to have
less weight in determining the meaning of the constitutional provision. The
significance of the Anglo-American ideal of local self-government, for
example, is obscure in its application to a constitutional restriction in
terms also applicable to types of special legislation other than local-such
types as grant a divorce to Mary Jones, change the name of John Smith
to John Jones, declare Ed White of age, or authorize Bill Brown to practice
medicine. Cf. Horack and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight
Zone (1937) 12 Ind. L. J. 183, 193.
34. Ladd v. Holmes (1901) 40 Ore. 167, 172, 66 Pac. 714, 716, 91 Am.
St. Rep. 457, 461. The most frequent application of this principle is to
classifications of cities or counties according to population. If the spread
between the upper and lower limits is not extremely narrow, the courts
usually take for granted a reasonable relation between the basis of classi-
fication and the purpose and subject of the act. See Cobbs v. Home Ins. Co.
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idea that a situation calling for legislative action might arise to
which a general law could not be made applicable is therefore a
fallacy.35 Yet twenty-odd states6 have made this idea the basis
of constitutional provisions, and courts have from time to time
tried to apply the fallacy to fact situations.3 This folly reached
its height, perhaps, when a distinguished group of political sci-
entists included the "no local or special act where a general act
can be made applicable" provision in a "model" state constitu-
(1920) 18 Ala. App. 206, 91 So. 627; McLaughlin v. Ford (1925) 168 Ark.
1108, 273 S. W. 707; McInerney v. Denver (1892) 17 Colo. 302, 29 Pac.
516; Givens v. Hillsborough County (1903) 46 Fla. 502, 35 So. 88, 110 Am.
St. Rep. 104; People v. Onahan (1897) 170 Ill. 449, 48 N. E. 1003;
Indianapolis v. Navin (1897) 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. 525, 526, 51 N. E. 80,
41 L. R. A. 337, 344; Eckerson v. Des Moines (1908) 137 Iowa 452, 115
N. W. 177, 185; Parker-Washington Co. v. Kansas City (1906) 73 Kan.
722, 85 Pac. 781; State v. Cooley (1893) 56 Minn. 540, 58 N. W. 150; State
v. St. Louis County Dist. Court (1895) 61 Minn. 542, 64 N. W. 190;
State v. Speed (1904) 183 Mo. 186, 81 S. W. 1260; State v. Clayton (1910)
226 Mo. 292, 126 S. W. 506; State v. Frank (1900) 60 Neb. 327, 83 N. W.
74; State v. Malone (1905) 74 Neb. 645, 105 N. W. 893; Matter of Church
(1883) 92 N. Y. 1; Admiral Realty Co. v. New York 206 N. Y. 110, 99
N. E. 241, 249, Ann. Cas. 1914A 1054; Marmet v. State (1887) 45 Ohio St.
63, 12 N. E. 463; Commonwealth v. Mathews (1931) 303 Pa. 163, 154 Atl.
359; State v. Schragg (1930) 159 Wash. 68, 292 Pac. 410; State v. Archi-
bold (1911) 146 Wis. 363, 131 N. W. 895; McGarvey v. Swan (1908) 17
Wyo. 120, 96 Pac. 697. In New Jersey, classification of cities not based on
population has been upheld although at the time of the passage of the law
the class had only one member. Van Reipen v. Jersey City (1896) 58 N. J.
L. 262, 33 Atl. 740 ("any municipal corporation having a board of public
works, and a board of finance and taxation") ; State v. Govern (1885) 47
N. J. L. 368, 1 Atl. 835, aff'd sub nom. Govern v. Bumstead (1886) 48
N. J. L. 612, 9 Atl. 577; Rutgers v. New Brunswick (1880) 42 N. J. L. 51;
Van Riper v. Parsons (1878) 40 N. J. L. 123, 125. See also Matter of
Church (1883) 92 N. Y. 1.
35. One of the earliest and most thorough students of the subject was
guilty of the same fallacy. He wrote that one of the chief objections to
the prohibition of special and local legislation is that it interferes with the
proper adaptation of legislation to particular cases. Yet, on another page,
he says: "A general law is one which applies to and operates uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons, places or things, requiring legis-
lation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law." Binney, Restric-
tions upon Local and Special Legislation in the United States (1893) 32
Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 613, 622, 725. Perhaps Mr. Binney had in mind the
possibility of a desire by a progressive community to have something which
more backward communities would not wish. The courts would not hold
that this situation justified differentiation in the face of an absolute pro-
hibition of special legislation, and other bases for "valid" classification
might not exist. But the use of local option or home rule would solve this
problem.
36. See note 2, supra.
37. Notes 46-50, infra. The majority of jurisdictions hold, however,
that the question, whether a general law can be made applicable, is exclu-
sively for the legislature, see note 45, infra.
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tion prepared under the auspices of the National Municipal
League.
38
The widespread use of this provision in state constitutions may
be explained by one or both of two historical facts. First, when
this language was originally used in the constitutions, the terms
"general act" and "special act" had not acquired definite mean-
ings ;39 the existence of the mischief was recognized, but the exact
nature of the evil had not been defined. One aspect of this situa-
tion was confusion of mind as to whether the distinguishing
point was merely a matter of form. Second, because England
and the American colonies and states had always had special leg-
islation,' 0 it was assumed that some special legislation was neces-
sary.4 1 There may have been some slight justification for this
view at the time Iowa and the other pioneers in the field adopted
the provision. The administrative organization was quite rudi-
mentary in that period.42 Consequently the legislatures felt that
it was necessary to exercise administrative and judicial func-
tions.43 This lack of adequate administrative machinery does not
exist today.
38. "The legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case where
a general act can be made applicable; and whether a general act can be
made applicable shall be a judicial question. No local or special act shall
take effect until approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon in
the district to be affected, except acts repealing local or special acts in
effect before the adoption of this constitution and receiving a two-thirds
vote of all members of the legislature on the question of their repeal."
A Model State Constitution (Rev. ed., published by the National Municipal
League) 5, sec. 21. This section follows the language of the Michigan
Constitution, art. V, sec. 30.
39. Prior to the adoption of the constitutional provisions, the phrases
"special act" and "local act" had no legal significance. "Local act," particu-
larly, had no defined meaning in the common law. McGregor v. Baylies
(1865) 19 Iowa 43, 47. General and special had been used as synonyms
respectively for public and private in connection with the doctrine of judi-
cial notice. See 1 Blackstone Com. *85.
40. Clifford, History of Private Bill Legislation (1885); Binney, Restric-
tions upon Local and Special Legislation in the United States (1893) 32
Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 613.
41. "We must have some local legislation in Georgia * * * ." Delegate
Hansell, as quoted in Small, Debates of the Georgia Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1877, 166.
42. See II Massachusetts Constitutional Convention Bulletin (1917) 483.
43. Corporations were chartered by special acts. Va. Acts of 1842-1843,
92-102. Banks were examined by committees of the legislature in some
states. Ga. Acts of 1831, 280; Ga. Acts of 1837, 273. Physicians were
admitted to practice by name. Ga. Acts of 1831, 185; Ga. Acts of 1855-56,
499; Ga. Acts of 1857, 283; Ga. Acts of 1876, 393. Divorces were granted.
Mont. Acts of 1864-65, 554, 610, 674, 685, 695, 699, 700; Va. Acts of 1849-50,
227-230. Names were changed. Va. Acts of 1847-48, 348. Illegitimate chil-
dren were legitimated. Clayton's Compilation of Ga. Laws (1812) 249, 510.
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But whatever the origin of the constitutional phrase, "can be
made applicable," the constitutional provision containing it has
been unsatisfactory. This is due in part to the doctrine that
whether a general law can be made applicable is a legislative
question in the absence of a contrary constitutional declaration."
In a majority of jurisdictions the courts will not consider whether
provision can be made by general law but will treat the legisla-
tive determination as conclusive.4 5 South Carolina 6 and Indi-
ana'7 seem to be the only jurisdictions in which this doctrine has
been expressly repudiated by the courts when the question was
squarely presented. However, Iowa 4 and Nevada- apparently
agree with South Carolina and Indiana, and cases in other juris-
dictions have held special laws invalid because a general law
could be made applicable, without discussing the effect of the
implied legislative determination to the contrary.50 Other cases 1
have said that statutes were unconstitutional because they vio-
lated both the "provision can be made by general law" clause and
some specific prohibition. Even in South Carolina the rule is
that the legislative determination of the question must be given
44. In Minnesota the constitution was amended to make the question one
for the courts, but they have not invoked the clause to declare statutes
unconstitutional, relying rather on the specific prohibitions of special legis-
lation. Anderson, Special Legislation in Minnesota (1923) 7 Minn. L. Rev.
133, 143, 144.
45. Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie (1899) 173 U. S. 528; Herschbach
v. Kaskaskia, etc. Dist. (1914) 265 Ill. 388, 106 N. E. 942; Gentile v. State
(1868) 29 Ind. 409; Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.
1904) 339. "To determine under a state constitution what can be accom-
plished by general or special legislation, has been, with but few exceptions,
held to be a question solely for the Legislature." Oklahoma City v. Shields
(1908) 22 Okla. 265, 305, 100 Pac. 559, 576. See Note (1892) 14 L. R. A.
566.
46. Carolina Grocery Co. v. Burnet (1909) 61 S. C. 205, 39 S. E. 381,
51 L. R. A. 687; Thomas v. Spartanburg R. etc. Co. (1915) 100 S. C. 478,
480, 85 S. E. 50. Cf. Pell v. Newark (1878) 40 N. J. L. 71.
47. Heckler v. Conter (1933) 206 Ind. 376, 187 N. E. 878, disapproving
Gentile v. State (1868) 29 Ind. 409, cited supra, note 45. See Horack and
Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone (1936) 12 Ind. L. J.
109, 113.
48. Ex parte Pritz (1858) 9 Iowa 30, 36.
49. Quilici v. Strosnider (1911) 34 Nev. 9, 115 Pac. 177, 180.
50. McGregor v. Bavlies (1865) 19 Iowa 43; Miller & Lux v. Board
(1922) 189 Cal. 254, 208 Pac. 304, 314; cf. People v. Mullender (1901) 132
Cal. 217, 64 Pac. 299.
51. Bloss v. Lewis (1895) 109 Cal. 493, 41 Pac. 1081; Stratman v.
Commonwealth (1910) 137 Ky. 500, 125 S. W. 1094, 136 Am. St. Rep. 299,
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 949. In Openshaw v. Halfin (1902) 24 Utah 426, 68
Pae. 138, 91 Am. St. Rep. 796, the equal protection of law clause was in-
volved.
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due consideration and should not be overruled by the courts if
predicated upon any reasonable hypothesis.12 If a general law
on the same subject has already been passed, it would seem that
the legislature has signified its belief that a general law can be
made applicable, and the courts should declare a subsequent spe-
cial law unconstitutional. It has been so held,53 but there is
strong authority to the contrary based on the idea that a deter-
mination by one legislature is not binding on a subsequent legis-
lature.-4 If the same legislature should pass both a general and
a special law on the same subject, would these latter courts hold
that the legislators have a perfect right to change their minds?
If the second view (that the courts should not interfere even
though there is an existing general law) is followed, the consti-
tutional provision becomes merely directory.5 To strengthen the
provision four states have added a declaration that the question
whether a general law can be made applicable shall be a judicial
question.56
In a jurisdiction where the courts hold that whether a general
law can be made applicable is a legislative question but becomes
judicial when a general law is passed, the rule might be stated
thus: No special law shall be passed in any case for which provi-
sion has been made by general law. In a number of states the
rule is so stated in the constitution.57
II
It is probable that public opinion serves to check special legis-
lation to some extent. So do considerations of legislative con-
venience. The extent to which they control is very slight how-
ever.58 On this, as on most matters of everyday governmental
52. Thomas v. Spartanburg R. etc. Co. (1915) 100 S. C. 478, 85 S. E. 50.
53. Leatherwood v. Hill (1906) 10 Ariz. 16, 85 Pac. 405, semble; Ventura
County Harbor Dist. v. Ventura County (1930) 211 Cal. 271, 295 Pac. 6;
State v. Drabelle (1914) 258 Mo. 568, 167 S. W. 1008. Cf. Henderson v.
Koenig (1902) 168 Mo. 356, 68 S. W. 72, 78; State v. Anslinger (1903)
171 Mo. 600, 71 S. W. 1041.
54. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. State (1911) 97 Ark. 473, 477, 134 S. W. 970;
Indianapolis v. Nevin (1897) 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. 525, 41 L. R. A. 337;
Washoe County, etc. Dist. v. Beemer (Nev. 1935) 45 P. (2d) 779, 784;
Oak Cliff v. State (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) 77 S. W. 24, 26.
55. Powell v. Durden (1895) 61 Ark. 21, 31 S. W. 740, 742.
56. Kan., art. II, sec. 17; Mich., art. V, sec. 30; Minn., art. IV, sec. 33;
Mo., art. IV, sees. 53, 54. See also Ala., art. IV, see. 105.
57. Ala., art. IV, sec. 105; Ga., art. I, sec. 4; Ky., sec. 60; Md., art. III,
sec. 33; Miss., art. IV, sec. 87; Pa., art. III, sec. 7.
58. That factors other than the language of constitutions play a part in
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policy, public opinion is only slowly aroused.59 The abuse of
special legislation is not spectacular enough, its undesirable con-
sequences are not glaring enough, to attract and hold the atten-
tion of the public at large. Undoubtedly the passage of a large
number of special bills is a nuisance to any legislature, but this
inconvenience is offset in most cases by a corresponding oppor-
tunity to gain favor with those who seek the passage of special
acts. The legislator's greatest opportunity to impress members
of his constituency lies in his ability to obtain the passage of
special acts which they desire.
Some early American cases held that an inherent restriction
in the republican form of government prevented state legisla-
tures from passing valid laws that are unjust, or immoral.60
The courts could therefore hold statutes void which they con-
sidered against natural justice and common right, although there
was no provision in the state constitution which would make
them invalid. This doctrine has been discredited and almost, if
not entirely, abandoned in the later cases.61 Therefore no type
of special legislation would be held invalid by a court unless it
could hold it unconstitutional.62 This is well settled today al-
though an early Vermont case said by way of obiter dictum that
the exemption of "a particular person from the general liability
by law attaching to all other persons similarly situated * * *
would be void, probably, as an act of special legislation, upon
general principles of reason and justice."63
Although "general principles of reason and justice" do not
constitute a restriction on the passage of special laws, there are
results is rather obvious. To consider a few illustrations: Maryland with
comparatively elaborate restrictions has about the same poor success at
curtailing legislation as Tennessee with few restrictions and Massachusetts
with none. Ohio with comparatively slight constitutional regulation has a
minimum of special and local laws.
59. Common experience makes this a truism. Dr. George Gallup in The
Way the People Are Thinking, N. Y. Times Magazine, April 24, 1938, says
that the American Institute of Public Opinion has found the typical Ameri-
can remarkably alive to the issues of the day and highly articulate about
them. Perhaps this is true of the typical American, but it is certainly true
that talk is all he does about many of these issues.
60. Sedgwick, Statutory and Constitutional Law (1857) 147.
61. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 175, 177, 264, 345;
Gray v. McLendon (1910) 134 Ga. 224, 67 S. E. 859; Bertholf v. O'Reilly
(1878) 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323.
62. Davis v. State (1880) 68 Ala. 58, 44 Am. Rep. 128; Sayles v. Christie
(1900) 187 Ill. 420, 58 N. E. 480.
63. Hatch v. Vermont C. R?. R. (1852) 25 Vt. 49, 61.
1939l
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certain limitations, implied from well known constitutional pro-
visions, that do. These provisions relate to the exercise of the
powers of government by three separate departments. The im-
plication is that the legislature shall exercise only legislative
functions-its pronouncements must be laws, not decrees. So
it has been held that a legislature cannot determine which of two
claimants is entitled to an office,64 nor vacate, modify, revive or
validate a judgment which determines a controversy on its
merits,'6 5 nor grant new trials nor rehearings.1 It has been said
that a legislature cannot confirm title to land so as to adjudicate
conflicting claims, 67 and that it cannot determine the right to the
custody of minors.68 All these matters are said to involve judi-
cial questions outside the sphere of the legislature.,,
Certain other provisions common to perhaps all the state con-
stitutions serve to control special legislation to some slight extent
without directly referring to it. These provisions guarantee
"equal protection of the laws" and "due process" and forbid de-
privation of rights unless by the law of the land. These clauses
usually appear in the bill of rights and serve principally to check
class legislation but incidentally certain kinds of special legisla-
tion.7° Then there are requirements of uniform taxation,71 county
officers,72 and courts.73
Investigation of the legislative history of any of the older
states or of the recent legislation of the New England states
shows conclusively that the checks discussed so far are not very
64. State v. Carr (1891) 129 Ind. 44, 28 N. E. 88, 13 L. R. A. 177.
65. Menges v. Dentler (1859) 33 Pa. 495, 75 Am. Dec. 616; Bates v.
Kimball (Vt. 1824) 2 Chipman 77.
66. In re Greene (1901) 166 N. Y. 485, 60 N. E. 183; Dorsey v. Gary
(1872) 37 Md. 64, 11 Am. Rep. 528.
67. Spragg v. Shriver (1855) 25 Pa. 282, 64 Am. Dec. 698. See in this
connection Wellington v. Wellington (1891) 46 Kan. 213, 26 Pac. 415;
Holden v. James (1814) 11 Mass. 396, 6 Am. Dec. 174, 176.
68. Ex parte Tillman (1910) 84 S. C. 552, 66 S. E. 1049, 1053, 26 L. R.
A. (N. S) 781.
69. Two acts found in Georgia laws are typical. One authorizes thejudge of a certain superior court to enter settled the case of Jesse A. Glenn
charged with homicide. Ga. Acts of 1866, 208. The other reinstates Wm. C.
Campbell and Nicholas C. Campbell of the County of Meriwether as execu-
tors of the will of their father-evidently an encroachment upon the
province of the Court of Ordinary. Ga. Acts of 1870, 457.
70. See Anderson, Special Legislation in Minnesota (1923) 7 Minn. L.
Rev. 133, 136, 141.
71. Mo. Const. art. X, sec. 3.
72. Ga. Const. art. II, sec. 3.
73. Pa. Const. art. VI, sec. 26.
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effective74 Special legislation has and will run rampant in spite
of them. Direct constitutional regulation is the only way to stamp
out the evil.
One type of restriction placed in the constitutions for this pur-
pose was the specific prohibition. The framers of the constitution
would list subjects on which special legislation should not be
passed. It was impossible to make these lists complete, and the
result was a change in the subjects of special legislation with fre-
quently very little reduction in the amount. North Carolina is a
good example. Article II, Section 29, and Article VIII, Section 1,
of the Constitution of that state list fourteen subjects on which
the legislature is forbidden to pass special laws. In 1929 in spite
of these restrictions 724 special acts were passed.7 5 New York6
and New Jersey7 7 have attempted to curb the tide by prohibiting
special and local acts on specific subjects; nevertheless their ses-
sion laws are not free from local legislation. The legislatures of
Mississippi and Maryland still pass much local and private legis-
lation despite the specific prohibitions in their constitutions. In
some states narrow interpretation of the language specifying the
prohibited subjects has had a part in bringing about unsatis-
factory results.
North Carolina, although not very successful in curbing the
passage of special and local laws, was the first to impose the safe-
guard of local notice around their passage. Section 12 of Article
II of its present constitution was taken from an amendment to
the original constitution. The Amendment was adopted in 1835
and provided that the General Assembly shall not pass any pri-
vate law unless it shall be made to appear that thirty days' notice
of application to pass such law shall have been given.71 Several
other states including Georgia,19 Missouri,80 Pennsylvania,8' and
Texas 12 adopted similar provisions.
74. Connecticut has a separate volume for local and special acts. A
majority of the Massachusetts acts are local or special. See also the
Tennessee Session Laws; in that state a prohibition of special acts relating
to municipalities is the only important restriction.
75. See Van Hecke, Four Suggested Improvements in the North Carolina
Legislative Process (1930) 1, 9, 11.
76. N. Y. Const. art. III, sec. 18.
77. N. J. Const. art. IV, sec. 7, pars. 1 and 11 (added by amendment).
78. N. C. Code of 1854, p. 24.
79. Ga. Const. art. VII, sec. 16.
80. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 54.
81. Pa. Const. art. III, sec. 8.
82. Tex. Const. art. III, sec. 57.
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Another type of restriction, somewhat similar but less effec-
tive, provides that all laws of a general nature must be uniform
in their operation throughout the state. In most of the consti-
tutions8 3 where this provision appears, it is coupled with one of
the other general restrictions just discussed and, in a few,84 with
lists of specific restrictions. The uniformity clause itself has not
been the basis of very many cases holding statutes unconstitu-
tional. The general rule disclosed by the cases is that the re-
quired uniformity cannot be defeated by amendment or partial
repeal."' When an existing general law provides for a given sit-
uation, this uniformity requirement operates in the same manner
as the other mandatory general restrictions and makes a subse-
quent special law unconstitutional. 6 This follows from the fact
that the special act in order to have any effect on the given situ-
ation must amend, suspend, or partially repeal the general act
and will thereby interfere with its uniform operation. This phase
of the act would not be of any importance under constitutions
containing other mandatory general restrictions. It would be
important if the constitution contained in addition to the uni-
formity requirement only specific restrictions or only the provi-
sion that no special law shall be passed in any case for which pro-
vision can be made by general law.
In another phase this constitutional provision prevents the pas-
sage of laws general in form and dealing with a general subject
but containing exceptions. 87 The other mandatory restrictions
previously mentioned prevent the passage of special laws where
there is an existing general law. The provision now under dis-
cussion forbids the placing of exceptions in a law of a generat
nature. Just what is a law of a general nature has never been
clearly determined. 8 It seems that the legislature may, so far
83. See, e. g., Ga. Const. art. I, sec. 4; Ind. Const. art. IV, sec. 23; S. C
Const. art. III, sec. 34.
84. See, e. g., Fla. Const. art. III, sec. 21; Iowa Const. art. I, sec. 6, art.
III, sec. 30.
85. Omnibus R. Co. v. Baldwin (1881) 57 Cal. 160; Darling v. Rodgers
(1871) 7 Kan. 592; but see People v. Judge (1861) 17 Cal. 547; Sprague v.
Fremont, etc., R. C. (1888) 6 Dak. 86, 50 N. W. 617.
86. See cases cited in note 85, supra.
87. Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors (1920) 183 Cal. 434, 192 Pac. 40.
88. State v. Davis (1896) 55 Ohio St. 15, 44 N. E. 511, speaks of "laws
having a general subject-matter and therefore of a general nature,"
whereas State v. Spellmire (1902) 67 Ohio St. 77, 65 N. E. 619, 622, says,
"It is obvious that every law upon a general subject is not per se, nor by
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as this provision is concerned, provide by special act for organiz-
ing an irrigation district in Madera County but cannot provide
how irrigation districts shall be organized in counties generally
and except from the operation districts which had adopted a
charter prior to a stated date.89 As a result of the vagueness with
which it indicates the field to which it is to apply, this provision
will interfere only slightly with special legislation.
Until 1926 the restrictions on special legislation contained in
the Constitution of Missouri were the strongest in the United
States. They are (1) prohibitions of special laws on thirty-two
specific subjects ranging from laws "regulating the affairs of
counties, cities, townships, wards or school districts" to laws
"giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds"; (2) provi-
sion that no local or special law shall be enacted in all other cases
where a general law can be made applicable; (3) declaration that
whether general law can be made applicable is a judicial ques-
tion ;"° (4) requirement that notice of intention to apply for
special or local law be published in the locality where the matter
or thing to be affected may be situated, at least thirty days prior
to introduction of bill, and that notice be recited in act according
to its tenor."1 The express constitutional provisions have been
strengthened by the ruling of the Supreme Court of Missouri
that where the legislature has adopted a general law applicable
to a subject, the court in determining the validity of a subse-
quent special law on the subject need not determine the necessity
of a special law or whether a general law can be made ap-
plicable.92
The foregoing glance at the situation presented by restrictions
of state constitutions on special and local legislation shows that
this corner of the field of constitutional law is in an unsatisfac-
tory state. The very language of the constitutional prohibition
constitutional intendment, necessarily a law of a general nature." See also
Rambo v. Larrabee (1903) 67 Kan. 634, 73 Pac. 915; Richardson v. Kansas
City Bd. of Ed. (1906) 72 Kan. 629, 84 Pac. 538, 540; Vermont Loan &
Trust Co. v. Whithed (1891) 2 N. D. 82, 49 N. W. 318, 320.
89. Mordecai v. Board of Supervisors (1920) 183 Cal. 434, 192 Pac. 40.
90. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 53.
91. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 54. Art. IX, sec. 7, provides that the classes
of cities and towns created by the General Assembly shall not exceed four,
and that provision for organization, classification, and power of cities and
towns shall be made by general laws. Art. XII, sec. 2, prohibits special
corporate charters.
92. State ex rel. Garesche v. Roach (1914) 258 Mo. 541, 167 S. W. 1008.
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of special and local statutes where general statutes can be made
applicable encourages special and local legislation by implying
that there are instances calling for its use. Furthermore, the
language is inconsistent with the judicial definition of local, spe-
cial, and general laws. The restrictions which consist of lists
prohibiting laws upon certain specified subjects are, because of
the difficulty of foreseeing every possibility, necessarily incom-
plete. This latter plan of control is also subject to the objection
that a resourceful lawyer can always raise the question whether
a particular subject is covered by the language used in the con-
stitution. The provision that no special or local law shall be
enacted in any case which is provided for by general law leaves
the legislature too much freedom of choice and frequently raises
for the judiciary the puzzling question whether a given case is
provided for by a certain existing general law. The requirement
that laws of a general nature have a uniform operation is not
sufficiently restrictive and presents the problem: What is a law
of a general nature? The condition precedent of notice and the
condition subsequent of a referendum 3 may serve to remove or
at least to mitigate the deprivation of self-government, but they
give little relief to the legislature.
Practically the only suggestion that has been made"' for
remedying the situation as a whole is the adoption of the prac-
tice of the English Parliament. Parliament requires the presen-
tation of a petition for the passage of the bill, before the houses
convene. The preamble of the bill must allege facts showing a
need for special legislation, and, even if the bill is unopposed,
proof of the allegations must be made before a committee. 5 The
proposal to use similar procedure in this country overlooks the
different personnel and traditions of American legislatures. It
seems to the present writer that it is most unlikely that our legis-
lators will take their committee responsibilities as seriously as
do members of Parliament.8 Can they be expected to abandon
the long and well established practice of passing whatever local
93. This requirement has been used little if at all in constitutions, but
several states have statutes which require a referendum.
94. Horack and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone(1937) 12 Ind. L. J. 183, 199; Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legisla-
tion (1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 351, 384.
95. Clifford, History of Piivate Bill Legislation (1885).
96. See the unfavorable comparison of state legislative committees with
Congressional committees in Chamberlain, Legislative Processes (1936) 90.
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acts are approved by the representatives of the localities affected?
The proposed plan has been incorporated in the Mississippi Con-
stitution and has been adopted voluntarily by the Massachusetts
General Court. A considerable amount of special and local legis-
lation is nevertheless passed in each of these states-so much,
in fact, that a separately bound volume is required for it.97 Other
criticisms that can properly be made of the English system are
that it does not relieve the legislature of the burden of handling
these comparatively unimportant matters and that it does not
permit local self-government. The different views of the inhabi-
tants of the locality may be heard by the committee, but there
is no requirement that the view of the majority prevail. The
exercise of political powers by citizens of the various communi-
ties, as local communities, has been said to be the most important
feature of our system of government. 8 According to this view
legislative efficiency is not the only desideratum; local autonomy
with a minimum of interference by the state legislature is also
important.
In all fields of human endeavor we observe some pioneer mak-
ing a discovery or taking a progressive step and others wonder-
ing why they had not thought of it long before. In 1926 the state
of Arkansas adopted an amendment to its constitution which
read as follows: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local
or special act. This Amendment shall not prohibit the repeal of
local or special acts." 9 This is a far simpler and more compre-
hensive solution than the plan used in Missouri. Certainly, it
does not eliminate all problems of construction and application.
Such problems are inherent in written constitutions. Their num-
97. See Miss. Const. art. IV, see. 59; Miss. Code (1930) sec. 5958; Mass.
Const. Debates at 316. The Georgia Constitution of 1877 contained a some-
what similar provision (art. III, sec. 7, par. 15), which was stricken in
1886. See Ga. Code (1933) sec. 2-1815.
98. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928) 512,
sec. 188. Cf. Thieme, A Business System of City Government (1934) 65,
67: "The cities of European countries enjoy the blessings of home rule,
but if they were asked what it means they would probably not know the
term, for the reason that they have known nothing else for from thirty-five
to seventy-five years. * * * In this country our great powerful cities em-
bracing the culture, intelligence and wealth of the state must go like
beggars to a state legislature composed of representatives, political or
otherwise, from the farms and villages and cities throughout the state,
wholly unacquainted with city problems and usually quite indifferent to
them."
99. Amendment 14, Ark. Dig. of Stats. (1937) 188. See also note 116,
infra.
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ber and complexity should be reduced with the adoption of this
provision. It has the advantage of simplicity of statement, and
it eliminates questions concerning when a general law can be
made applicable, how to reconcile the judicial concept of a gen-
eral law with the idea that a general law is not always applicable,
what is covered by the numerous specifications of forbidden sub-
ject matter. When a law is challenged under the Missouri lan-
guage, thirty-odd prohibitions must be tentatively considered.
The decisions under one prohibition do not necessarily assist in
the interpretation of another prohibition. The Missouri consti-
tution has been successful in curbing the passage of special and
local laws,100 but its provisions on the subject seem to encourage
litigation. The Missouri cases indicate that the courts of the
state have been frequently called upon to decide cases under these
provisions of the constitution.1 1 In some of the other states
similar provisions of the constitutions have not even been suc-
cessful in checking special and local legislation. 1 2 In these states
there is need for a sounder rule because of the effect that it would
have upon the bulk of legislation as well as upon the case law.
Before the adoption of the constitutional amendment the Ar-
kansas legislature passed a great deal of local legislation. In
1919 the output filled three large volumes of more than a thou-
sand pages each-almost four thousand pages of local legisla-
tion. In 1923, 1,810 pages were filled with special legislation.
Since the adoption of the constitutional prohibition, the situation
is entirely different. In 1937 the special legislation in Arkansas
consisted of about a half-dozen acts authorizing appointment of
a court reporter in certain districts and an act to fix the salaries
of deputy prosecuting attorneys in the Third Judicial Circuit. 03
The reported cases indicate that the litigation over the applica-
tion of the constitutional amendment has revolved around the
question: What was the amendment intended to prohibit?104 Any
100. Courts are almost the only subject dealt with. Mo. Laws of 1931,
181, 184, 185, 188, 189, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197; Mo. Laws of 1937, 211, 216,
218, 219. Possibly these acts should be considered special only in form.
See also Mo. Laws of 937, 519. On pages 194 and 195 of Mo. Laws of 1937
are acts authorizing the judges of the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correc-
tion to appoint janitors. What weighty matters the legislatures sometimes
pursue!
101. See Mo. Dig. (1930) tit. Statutes, key no. 76.
102. E. g., Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina.
103. Ark. Acts of 1937, 26, 29, 191, 483, 1375.
104. Among other things it prohibits amendment of a local act. Denton




provision in this field will raise the question of the meaning of
"local or special act." This meaning is reasonably well settled
in principle in almost all of the states.'l 1 There remains of course
the problem of the application of the principle to individual cases.
Contrary to the belief of some, the result of tying the hands
of a state legislature by adopting a constitutional provision simi-
lar to the Arkansas amendment will not be disastrous. One of
the subjects upon which it is most frequently claimed that spe-
cial legislation is necessary in municipal corporations, yet many
state constitutions now forbid such legislation. Among them is
Pennsylvania's. The present constitution of that state was
adopted in 1873. After it had been in force for twenty-five years,
certain members of the state bar association proposed to strike
from the constitution the prohibition of local laws regulating the
affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school
districts. A committee was appointed by the association and in
1899 made a report favoring a recommendation by the associa-
tion of a constitutional amendment effecting a repeal of the pro-
hibition.1 The arguments of the committee and of those who
supported it in the ensuing debate were directed largely to the
disadvantages of enforced uniformity in city government. They
pointed out that there had been numerous attempts to evade the
constitution, that the result of the prohibition was that the le'gis-
lature classified cities, thereby in effect specially legislating for
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Alleghany, without being subject
to the usual safeguards placed around the passage of local laws,
and that the development of the large number of cities in the
third class was arrested because they were forced to operate
under a uniform charter, although they varied in size from 6,000
to 100,000 and in material interests-some being manufacturing
cities, some mining, and some maritime.107 The arguments were
promptly riddled by the opposition-one speaker observing that
the fact that one city was in the coal region and another in the
agricultural region made no difference since "the system of gov-
ernment of cities * * * is not for the regulation of their com-
mercial or business affairs."'18
105. See notes 7, 8, 31, 34, 35, supra.
106. (1899) 5 Pa. Bar Ass'n Rep. 134.
107. Id. at 217.
108. Id. at 231.
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Of course, the needs of cities differing commercially will differ
somewhat. A maritime city may need the power to build munici-
pal wharves. Why not give this power to all cities? It seems
clear that the solution is to be found in a general law conferring
a variety of powers from which each city will exercise as many
or as few as its particular needs justify. In other words, the
difficulty in Pennsylvania was with the general law passed to put
the constitution into effect and with the supreme court's inter-
pretation of the constitution and not with the constitutional prin-
ciple that municipalities should be created and regulated by gen-
eral laws. The Pennsylvania Bar Association was of this opinion
and rejected the committee's report by a two-to-one vote. 100 This
evidence that special legislation for towns and cities is not neces-
sary is all the more important because the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had interpreted the state constitution so as to de-
prive the legislature of the device of local option1 and so as to
limit the power to classify."'
The conclusion reached by the Pennsylvania Bar Association
is also the correct conclusion regarding other subjects of legis-
lation. There must be differentiation, but the requisite differen-
tiation can be accomplished by utilizing administrative or judi-
cial machinery, 1 2 local option" 3 or home rule,114 and classifica-
tion.115 In some instances only one of the three would be neces-
109. Id. at 241.
110. Appeal of Scranton School District (1886) 113 Pa. 176, 6 Atl. 158;
Commonwealth v. Reynolds (1891) 137 Pa. 389, 20 Atl. 1011.
111. Chalfant v. Edwards (1896) 173 Pa. 246, 33 Atl. 1048; Appeals of
Ayars (1889) 122 Pa. 266, 16 AtI. 356; David v. Clark (1884) 106 Pa. 377.
Constitutional amendments have relaxed the restrictions. Pa. States (1928
Cum. Sup.) vii.
112. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 4538-4541, 4556; Ga. Code (1933) sec.
95-905, par. 3; Mo. Const. art. 4, sec. 53, par. 13; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 1351.
113. See Mo. Laws of 1933, 284; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 6930; Ga. Acts
of 1890-1891, 96, Ga. Parks Ann. Code (1914) secs. 4831(a)-4831(nn).
Massachusetts combines classification with local option. Boston is put in a
class by itself, and the other cities are given a choice of several plans of
government. Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 43.
114. See Mo. Const. art. IX, sec. 16; Neb. Const. art. XI, sees. 2-5; N. Y.
Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930) c. 6a, sec. 20. See Story, Local Self-Govern-
ment for Cities and Counties (1920) 2 U. of Ill. L. Bull. 339-350 for a list
of states and a discussion of local self-government. See also note 98, supra.
115. See Ala. Code (1928) secs. 1739, 1743, 1758, 1759; Ill. Rev. Stats.(1937) c. 24; R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 6090-6094. Horack and Welsh, in
Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone (1937) 12 Ind. L. J. 183, 197,
show the needs for sounder judicial standards of classification. Their con-
clusions on other points are not so obviously correct. They recognize the
conflict between centralization and local autonomy and advocate centraliza-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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sary, in others two would be required, and in still others all three.
Some special and local legislation can be replaced by general laws
granting, to all, privileges which otherwise might be doled out to
individuals or localities. Differentiation should be accomplished
by general laws based upon a statewide plan rather than by
special laws passed because localities or groups of individuals
desire the special laws and are able to persuade a politically-
minded committee that they should have them. Literal uniform-
ity is an unobtainable ideal, but there will be a nearer approach
to uniformity in the passage of general laws which provide for
classification, local self-government, or judicial or administrative
machinery. Home rule results in about the same want of uni-
formity as does the passage of special legislative charters, since
local attorneys draw the charter in either case. However, home
rule relieves the legislature of the burden of local affairs and re-
moves the cause of much log-rolling, lobbying, corruption, and
undue multiplication of state law. Grover Cleveland's conclusion
seems to be the correct one. He said, in an 1884 governor's mes-
sage to the New York Legislature, that local legislation and
grants of special privileges "ought not upon any pretext to be
permitted to encumber the statutes of the state."'116
tion through the continued interference of the legislature in local affairs
by means of a plan similar to that of the English Parliament. They seem
to think that the difference in needs of different communities justifies the
statement of an Indiana judge that "in many cases local laws are necessary
because general ones cannot be properly and justly applicable." The present
article has undertaken to show that, according to judicial definition, this
is not true of local and general laws as those terms are used in the state
constitution. See supra, note 35, and accompanying text.
116. Quoted in Mass. Const. Debates at 317. This conclusion is reached
also by those who prepared A Suggested State Constitution in Appendix A
of Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 1002, art. IV, sec. 1 of which reads:
"The General Assembly shall pass no local or special laws * * * "
1939]
Washington University Open Scholarship
